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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Ann, Sec. 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1988) 
grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over judg-
ments of the Court of Appeals. This Court granted a peti-
tion for writ of certiorari in this case on August 31, 1989, 
based on the statutory authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988). The matter was originally appealed 
to the Utah Supreme Court in case no* 870064 from an order 
of the Third Judicial District Courts Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. By an Order of Trans-
fer, the Utah Supreme Court referred the matter to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court, which decision was entered on December 23, 1988. The 
Court of Appeals1 Order Denying Rehearing was entered on 
January 26, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Has the Court of Appeals departed from the 
accepted course of judicial proceedings or departed from a 
lower court as to call for an exercise of this Court's power 
and supervision. 
2. Whether or not three 3" x 5" cards contain the 
signature of the decedent, Robert E. Erickson, and if such 
writing is his signature whether or not such signature was 
placed on the cards to authenticate them as his Last Will 
and Testament for attestation purposes. 
3. If the cards themselves constitute the Last 
Will and Testament of Robert E. Erickson. 
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REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
matter is reported in Estate of Erickson v. Misaka 766 P.2d 
1085 (Utah App. 1988) and 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct. App. 
Dec. 23, 1988) Sec. 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1988). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code. Ann. Sec. 75-2-503 Holographic Will. 
A will which does not comply with Sec. 75-2-502 
is valid as a holographic will, whether or not 
witnessed, if the signature and the material 
provisions are in the handwriting of the testator. 
If there are several holographic wills in 
existence with conflicting provisions, the 
holographic will which is established by date or 
other circumstances to be the Will that was last 
executed shall control. If it is impossible to 
determine which Will was last executed, the 
consistent provisions of the several Wills shall 
be considered valid and the inconsistent 
provisions shall be considered invalid. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 68-3-12 (2) (r). Rules of 
Construction. 
(2) In the construction of these statutes, the 
following definitions shall be observed, unless 
the definition would be inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the Legislature, or repugnant 
to the context of the statute: 
(r) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or 
sign written with the intent to authenticate any 
instrument or writing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action based on the Petition of Tatsumi 
Misaka, requesting the admission of three 3" x 5" cards as 
the holographic will of Robert E. Erickson. The Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert E. Erickson opposed 
the admission of the cards as the holographic will of Robert 
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E. Erickson. The cards were admitted to Probate by the 
trial court, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. The 
matter was originally appealed to the Utah Supreme Court in 
case no. 870064 with this court transferring the matter for 
determination by the Court of Appeals on February 25, 1988. 
On appeal the Utah State Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court finding that the trial court had improperly admitted 
the cards as the holographic will of Robert E. Erickson. 
Statement of the Facts 
Robert E. Erickson died in an automobile accident 
on June 16, 1983. At the time of his death, his known heirs 
were his wife Dorothy Jean Erickson, his son Robert Erickson, 
Jr., and a daughter Sheryl Swaner (R-14). The Last Will and 
Testament of Robert E. Erickson dated June 9, 1955 (R-19-22) 
was admitted to Probate with First Interstate Bank of Utah, 
N.A. as the Personal Representative, on July 27, 1983 
(R-24). On October 11, 1985, Tatsumi Misaka filed a Petition 
to probate three 3M x 5" cards as the holographic will of 
Robert E. Erickson (R-70). (Copies of the cards are at R-33 
& 74 with originals at 3-P on Exhibits). The Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert E. Erickson moved to 
dismiss the Petition of Tatsumi Misaka on the grounds that 
the documents failed to meet the requirements of a valid 
holographic will and further that the documents were incapa-
ble of being probated (R-82-83). 
At trial, the Petitioner, through an expert, 
presented testimony that the cards were written by Robert E. 
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Erickson (R-143) and were prepared sometime within a four to 
six month time period (R-146). No testimony was presented 
that there was any testamentary intent on behalf of the 
decedent to have the cards be his Will, or that the name 
contained on one card was in fact the signature, not just a 
written name, of the decedent. The Personal Representative 
moved at the close of the Petitioner's evidence to dismiss 
the Petition for failure to meet its burden of proof, which 
Motion was denied by the Court* 
The Personal Representative submitted evidence at 
trial that: 
1. The writing contained on the three unattached 
separate cards were written in two different inks* (3-P) 
2. Only one card contained the date of August 27, 
1973. (3-P) 
3. The documents make only a partial distribution 
of the real and personal properties of the decedent which 
were owned when the cards were supposedly prepared. (R-135, 
154-155) 
4. The decedent had the knowledge and had on 
occasion prepared formal Wills for friends and relatives 
prior to and after the date of August 27, 1973, and had in 
fact prepared such within one and a half months of these 
cards. (R-152, 4-d) 
5. The name of the decedent as contained on one 
card was in fact not the signature of the decedent (there 
being a difference between how the decedent would write his 
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name rather than sign his name). (Note: The court reporter 
left a space at line 15-R-156 which should read A. "No. 1, 
his name is not his signature." See affidavit of Sheryl 
Swaner which is attached hereto as Appendix A.) 
6. The cards were not numbered. (3-P) 
7. The cards would only have been written when 
the decedent was under the influence of alcohol. (R-156) 
8. In the documents there were numerous abbrevia-
tions such as FH Store, REEJ, Sheryl, T.T. Matoka, T. 
Misaka, Dorothy and Bobby, without explanation as to who 
these items or people are or were. (3-P) 
Based upon the above and lack of evidence on other 
items that had not been proven or shown at trial, the 
Personal Representative submitted Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order for the Court's signature which 
items were rejected by the Court (R-112-119). The Court 
thereafter accepted the Order (R-120) and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as submitted by the Petitioner and 
admitted the cards to Probate as the holographic will of 
Robert E. Erickson. (R-122-125). 
The Court of Appeals in its decision agreed with 
the position of the Personal Representative that the Peti-
tioner , Tatsumi Misaka, had not met his burden of proof. 
The decision of the Appeals Court was based upon the lack of 
evidence presented by the petitioner and the nature of the 
cards themselves where the Appeals Court stated: 
"Our review of the purported holographic will in 
this case leads us to conclude that it does not 
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contain the signature required by the statute 
before it can be admitted to probate. 
The three cards in evidence are index cards on 
which only the unlined sides have been written* 
They were not attached to each other. There is no 
concluding language on any of the cards, and they 
otherwise give no indication that they are, taken 
together, a completed document. Indeed, the 
nature of the note cards, the use of abbrevia-
tions, lack of punctuation, and the perfunctory, 
open-ended wording strongly suggest that the 
cards, as a documents, are unfinished or 
constitute a draft. 
Although the handwritten name of the decedent 
appears in the phrase "I Robert E. Erickson do 
hereby state," the writing contains nothing 
indicating the name was intended as the required 
executing signature. There is nothing on the face 
of the cards to affirmatively or by necessary 
implication suggest that decedent wrote his name 
for any other purpose than to identify himself as 
the writer. See In re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 
36, 239 P. 404 (1925); see generally, Annotation, 
Place of Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.L.R. 
2d 926, 933-44 (1951). In short, there is no 
evidence that decedent's name was written in the 
introductory clause on one card with the intent 
that it constitute authentication of one or all of 
the cards as a will. Respondent, therefore, 
failed to make a prima facie showing that the 
purported holographic will contained the 
authenticating signature required by Sec.75-2-503. 
It is, of course possible for a handwritten name 
at the beginning of the body of a will to be 
written with the intent that it be the requisite 
signature. However, there must be support in the 
evidence for that intent. Standing alone, it is 
equivocal, leaving the decedent's final approval 
and authentication of the writing in doubt. 
Without more, it is an inadequate guard against 
writing being deleted, a possibility in this case 
if additional cards were written upon by Erickson 
only to be lost, misplaced, or discarded by him or 
others". (766 P.2d 1085, 1088) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Utah Court of Appeals in reviewing the testi-
mony and evidence as presented by Tatsumi Misaka correctly 
determined that Tatsum Misaka had failed to meet his burden 
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of proof in establishing that the documents were in fact the 
holographic will of Robert E. Erickson. The Court of 
Appeals did not depart or render an inappropriate decision 
nor did it abuse its discretion. The Court of appeals 
decision should remain intact, unaffected by this Court. 
POINT II 
The three 3" x 5" cards were never intended by the 
decedent, Robert E. Erickson, to be his last will and 
testament. The cards at most were notes. The name of 
Robert E. Erickson as it existed on one of the cards was not 
the signature of Robert E. Erickson for attestation purposes. 
The decedent had the knowledge and expertise to prepare 
formal wills and knew the requirement of properly executed 
wills. 
POINT III 
The three 3" x 5" cards are ambiguous and give no 
clear meaning as to the disposal of the decedent's estate. 
Names are misspelled and/or abbreviated and it would require 
speculation as to who the individuals or property is and to 
whom it should be given. The cards do not dispose of all of 
the decedent's property. The cards are impossible to be 
administered by the Personal Representative. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION BY THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
SHOULD STAND UNAFFECTED BY THIS COURT. 
The presumption of a proper decision by the 
Appeals Court rests with the Respondent. The Appellant must 
bear the burden of demonstrating error. See Litho Sales, 
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Inc. v, Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981). Absent a 
showing that the Appeals Court acted in excess of its 
authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason that its 
ruling is deemed capricious and arbitrary, its decision must 
stand. See Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). The Appeals Court must 
clearly have abused its discretion before this court should 
reverse that court's decision. Rule 43(3) Rules of the 
Supreme Court requires for a review of the Appeal Court 
decision that: 
"The Court of Appeals has rendered its decision 
that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such and departed from a lower court as 
to call for an exercise of this Court's power and 
supervision." 
The Court of Appeals decision has no "departure 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" 
as to required this court's intervention. The Court of 
Appeals decision must be shown to be clearly erroneous 
before this court should substitute its decision for that of 
the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the testimony as 
presented by the Petitioner, Tatsumi Misaka, at trial and 
found that the Petitioner's entire case consisted of three 
3" x 5" index cards which were unattached and found loosely 
in a drawer, that the cards were written in the handwriting 
of the decedent, Robert E. Erickson, and that the cards were 
prepared somewhere in a four to six month period. There was 
no showing whatsoever by the Appellant that there was any 
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intent by the testator that the card$ be his Last Will and 
Testament, nor was there any evidence to indicate that the 
name contained in the body of the Will was in fact the 
signature for authenticating purpose^. 
The Personal Representative! in its case in chief 
presented at the trial court that the name of Robert E. 
Erickson as contained in the body of the document was not 
his signature. (See Appendix A. Affidavit of Sheryl Swaner) 
This statement was never refuted, nor contradicted by the 
Appellant. The Utah Court of Appeals in its decision noted 
that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 68-3-12(2)(r) (1988) 
"... A decedent's handwritten name in the body of 
the proported holographic will is not, by itself, 
prima facie evidence that tjie document contains 
the decedent's signature, ^n the context of 
Sec. 75-2-503, such a handwritten name must have 
been written with the intent that it operates as 
an authentication of the document as a Will in 
order for it to be a signature. The purpose of 
our statutory scheme is to require a course of 
conduct which assures that $ person's Will is 
reduced to writing, and when handwritten, that the 
intention to have the writing take legal effect be 
indicated by a signature which records that fact. 
The signature requirement slfiows that the writer 
finally approved the writing and meant for it to 
be operative as a testamentary instrument. See 
Mechem, the Rule in Lemayne v. Stanley, 29 Mich. 
L. Rev. 685, 690-96 (1931).* Estate of Erickson, 
766 P.2d 1085, 1088. 
The name as contained in th^ cards in this case 
was not the signature of the decedent for attestation 
purposes. The Appellant never presented any evidence that 
the name contained therein was the signature of the decedent 
for authentication purposes and thus it properly reversed 
the trial court. The Utah State CourtL of Appeals had made a 
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determination that the Appellant "failed to make a prima 
facie showing that the purported holographic will contained 
the authenticating signature required by Sec. 75-2-503"• 
(Estate of Erickson, 766 P.2d 1085-1088) Based on such, the 
findings of the Appeal Court should be sustained. 
Additionally, the Appellant sets forth in its 
brief the issue that the signature of the decedent for 
attesting purposes was not raised at trial or on appeal. 
This statement as made by the Appellant is incorrect. The 
testimony of Sheryl Swaner at trial was that the name as 
contained on one of the cards was not the signature of the 
decedent and the case of In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 
570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952), was cited to the court for the 
specific purpose that the signature in the body of the 
document must be placed there with the intent to authen-
ticate the document. 
The argument as presented by the Personal Repre-
sentative requested the Court examine the cards and from 
those cards make a determination that there was no intent 
that the name as contained therein was the signature, and 
that the cards were at most, possible notes. The position 
taken at trial and the position taken in the brief has 
always remained the same for the Personal Representative and 
those items were in fact addressed at the trial level and in 
front of the Appellate Court. 
The Appellant argues that if the Court of Appeals 
decision is allowed to stand that it will significantly 
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prohibit a layman from preparing and|/or using a holographic 
will for testamentary purposes. Such a conclusion is 
incorrect because the decision actually helps a layman in 
preparing and using a holographic wijl. The Appeals Court 
has set forth that the name in a body of a document, so long 
as it is done with intent to authenticate the document, will 
make for a valid testamentary disposition of the decedent's 
property. Notes and drafts which are not meant to be testa-
mentary dispositions of property will not be admitted to 
probate to allow wrongful distribution of a decedent's 
estate under the Court of Appeals decision. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO TESTAMENTARY INDENT TO HAVE THE 
CARDS MADE AS THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE 
DECEDENT. 
The evidence presented by the Petitioner at trial 
was that the cards were written by Robert E. Erickson, 
sometime within a four to six month period of August 27, 
1973. After the presentation of this evidence, the Peti-
tioner rested its case. The Petitioner stated to the Court 
that the decedent was a layman and not familiar with the 
terms and requirements of preparing a formal Will, and thus 
to require that his signature appear either at the end to 
signify a completed document was therefore unnecessary and 
that the name as contained in the body of the cards should 
be intended to be the attesting signature of Robert E. 
Erickson to declare the cards to be his holographic will. 
The Exhibits as furnished to the Court (4-d), the Will of 
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the decedent as submitted to Probate, (R-19-22) and the 
testimony of Sheryl Swaner, the daughter of the decedent, 
that the decedent had prepared Wills for an uncle, grand-
father, and her stepmother's mother, (R-153) set forth that 
the decedent in this matter had the knowledge of the formal 
will requirements which existed at the time that the pur-
ported holographic will was supposedly prepared. In deter-
mining whether it was the intent of the decedent to have the 
cards as his holographic will, the Court may look at his 
knowledge and the requirements to which the decedent is 
aware at the time that the documents are prepared in deter-
mining whether or not his intent existed to have the docu-
ments determined to be his Last Will and Testament. (See In 
re Hughes1 Estate 140 Cal. App. 97, 35 P.2d 204 (1934)). In 
the matter at hand the decedent was extremely familiar with 
the requirements of a Will and the formalities which were 
required in the preparation of such a Will. The cards set 
forth that the document is the "Last Will and Test", not 
Testament of the decedent. The documents do not revoke any 
previous Wills. The documents have numerous abbreviations 
as to persons and entities. The cards are an incomplete 
disbursal of the real and personal properties owned by the 
decedent, and there is no residual clause in regards to 
other items or property which were known to be owned by the 
decedent at the time these documents were prepared. There 
is no signature at the end of the cards to signify complete-
ness or termination of the transfer of property. All of 
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these particular items were within the knowledge of the 
decedent and he failed to place them into these cards when 
he knew that there were formal requirements for these 
particular items. The decedent did r^ ot make these documents 
complete when he knew that completeness was necessary to 
have a proper testamentary disposition of his property. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-503 (1953 as amended) 
sets forth as follows: 
"A will which does not comply with section 
75-2-502 is valid as a holographic will, whether 
or not witnessed, if the signature and the 
material provisions are in the handwriting of the 
testator.. ." 
The name of the decedent is in the body of one card. Utah 
Law is unclear as to whether or not the signature must 
appear at the end of the document and the case law in this 
particular matter, as to where the signature needs to be 
placed, is split among the various jurisdictions throughout 
the United States. See generally, Annotation, Place of 
Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.L.R.2d 926 (1951). In 
the case at hand it would be better to have had, and required, 
that the signature be at the end of the documents so that 
there can be known by all concerned that the documents are 
finished and complete. As noted hereijn, there were consider-
able assets which remain unmentioned, and no additional 
cards are known at this time. The better rule of law would 
be that the signature needs to be at the end of a document 
so that all parties notice that the decedent had completed 
the document and desires to take no further action as to his 
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property and assets. In In re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 
36, 239 P. 404 (1925), the California Court held that though 
the name of the decedent was in the opening clause of a 
holographic will, such was not his signature for attesting 
purposes when it was clear that there was additional infor-
mation which the writer had intended to place in the docu-
ment. When the document is not complete on its face, then 
the signature or name of a decedent may not be in the 
document for other than identification purposes and not for 
the purpose of attestation. 
In the jurisdictions which have allowed the 
document to be signed in any part of the document, the 
Courts have been universal in their requirements that 1) the 
writing must be the signature of the decedent, with his 
intent that it be such, and 2) that the signature as placed 
in the documents, though not at the end, is done to attest 
to the document and declare it to be the Last Will and 
Testament of the decedent. (See 19 A.L.R.2d 926) The 
testimony at trial, from Sheryl Swaner, was that the name as 
contained in the body of the document is not his signature. 
(See Statements of Facts and Affidavit of Sheryl Swaner as 
attached hereto.) Testimony as presented by the Petitioner 
was that the document was written by the same person but 
this does not necessarily mean that the writing is the same 
as the persons signature. Sheryl Swaner was also questioned 
as to whether or not the name contained in the documents was 
such to be an attestation to be the declaration of 
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intentions of the decedent. Sheryl $waner states as follows: 
QUESTION: "Ma'am do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not this was your father's intentions or whether 
or not these were notes that he had written to himself?" 
ANSWER: "I believe that they were notes that he 
had written. I do not believe they Were his intentions, 
no." 
QUESTION: "What do you base that upon?" 
ANSWER: "Well I base it upon the fact that he 
would write those to himself at night when he had been 
drinking and that's all of the things were not in there 
that he owned at the time. It's incomplete." (R-158-159) 
When examining all these factors as they relate 
herein, it must be determined whether or not the name of the 
testator appearing in the holographic'will constitutes an 
authenticating signature. In the case of In re Manchester's 
Estate, 174 Cal. 417, 163 P. 358 (1917), the California 
Court stated: 
"The true rule, as we conceive it to be, is that, 
wherever placed, the fact that is was intended as 
an executing signature must satisfactorily appear 
on the face of the document itself. If it is at 
the end of the document, thi universal custom of 
mankind forces the conclusion that it was appended 
as an execution, if nothing to the contrary 
appears. If placed elsewhere, it is for the Court 
to say, from an inspection of the whole document, 
its language as well as its form, and the relative 
position of its parts, whether or not there is a 
positive and satisfactory inference from the 
document itself that the signature was so placed 
with the intent that it should there serve as a 
token of execution. If such inference thus 
appears, the execution may be considered as proven 
by such signature." (at 163 P. 358, 360) 
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At the time that the purported document was 
prepared, it was the decedent's custom to write notes to 
himself from which he would prepare formal documents on 
items upon which he intended to act. (R-155-156) 
Further, when looking at the cards themselves, the 
cards contain abbreviations such as "Test" for supposed 
testament, FH Store, Dorothy, REEJ, Sheryl, T Misaka, T.T. 
Matoka, and Bobby, all indicating possible notes to oneself, 
not a testamentary disposition of property. The cards 
themselves do not revoke any prior Wills, though in the 
documents as presented to Court from the previous Wills, 
specifically show that the decedent had the knowledge to 
require the revocation of prior Wills. Further, the dece-
dent would only prepare such cards while under the influence 
of alcohol. (R-156) When drinking, the decedent's hand-
writing would change as in the case herein were it starts 
small and gets larger. Additionally, the decedent was a 
good speller except while under the influence of alcohol and 
the documents as presented herein have numerous spelling 
errors as well as the abbreviations as previously noted. 
The cards contain no residual clause for the remainder of 
the decedent's estate. At the time of the preparation of 
the documents, the decedent held numerous other items of 
real and personal property which included three Drug Stores 
(Foothill, Cottonwood, and Stratford Avenue in Sugarhouse), 
real property on Mount Olympus, Salt Lake City, Utah, real 
property in Hawaii, apartment buildings on Main Street, a 
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car shop, a car dealership, mutual fulnds and bank accounts. 
(R 154-155) Nowhere in these documents is there any mention 
of these properties. In determining whether there is a 
testamentary disposition, the Courts have looked at whether 
or not the document is a complete testamentary disposition 
of the property. See In re Bernard's ftstate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 
P. 404 (1925); In re Leonard's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 8, 32 P.2d 
603 (1926); In re Devlin's Estate, 19$ Cal. 721, 247 P. 577 
(1926); In re Hurley's Estate, 178 Cal. 713, 174 P. 669 
(1918); also descent of Justice Traynbr, In re Bloch's 
Estate, 238 P.2d 21 (1952). 
The decedent was a "pack rat" and had kept every-
thing from 1940 to the present (R-158). The cards are at 
best notes of the decedent's possible ideas for making a 
Will in the future but not notes such as these where his 
intentions to be his testamentary disposition of his proper-
ty. It was the decedent's practice of preparing type 
written documents for his affairs upoh which he intended to 
act from the note cards. (R-155-156) The decedent had 
written notes down on cards upon which he never intended to 
act but never took the time to throw such cards away. When 
all of this is coupled with his knowledge of Wills and the 
requirements which existed at the time for those Wills 
including the placement of the name, Robert E. Erickson, the 
lack of residual clauses, the lack of addressing numerous 
items which he possessed at the time, abbreviations of items 
and persons, spelling problems, and his inebriation all set 
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forth that the name as set forth in the body of the cards is 
the written name of the decedent and not his signature with 
the intent to authenticate these cards as his Last Will and 
Testament* 
The Utah Supreme Court partially addressed the 
question of a signature in the case of In re Yowell's 
Estate, 75 Utah 312, 285 P. 285 (1930), at P. 295, wherein 
the court noted that the purported holographic will was 
"ending with and including the signature" of the decedent. 
When a document ends with a signature it can be stated with 
reasonable certainty that the document is complete. In this 
action there is no certainty which exists to say that the 
decedent ever intended these cards to be his testamentary 
disposition of his estate. The cards are not the holographic 
will of the decedent. 
POINT III 
THE NATURE OF THE CARDS THEMSELVES FAIL TO 
ESTABLISH A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE 
PROPERTY OF THE DECEDENT. 
The cards content, disposition of property and the 
extent of property mentioned in the cards establish that the 
cards cannot be a holographic will. The cards themselves 
were unattached and only from reading the cards could any 
sense of "joiner" be determined. There is no knowledge of 
any party if additional cards exist and based upon the fact 
that there are so many items of real and personal property 
which were owned by the decedent at the time of his death to 
which there was no disposition of those particular items, it 
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can be readily stated that either this is not a holographic 
will but merely notes, or that there might possibly be 
additional cards which would dispose of such property but 
which have never been discovered. (Note: At a previous 
hearing on a Motion to Dismiss, the Affidavit of Rod Cushing 
sets forth that the Affiant and all the heirs of the above 
Estate are without knowledge as to whether or not there are 
additional cards or papers for the documents in relation to 
the cards filed hereto. See R-84) The cards are written in 
two different inks with the dating in a different color from 
the beginning of the cards. No one knows when the cards 
were prepared or even if they were prepared at the same 
time. The best that can be said of the cards is that they 
were all prepared within a four to si^ month period. (R-146) 
The Utah Supreme Court in In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 
285 P. 299 (1930), has held that it is not necessary that 
the sheets be fastened together by some mechanical device, 
as long as under the facts of each casle there is a coherent 
running of the testamentary disposition of the property. In 
the case presently before this Court there is a lack of a 
finished document dealing with the property and assets of 
the decedent, thus even if there is a Coherency by reading 
the documents, there is an incompleteness as to the docu-
ments because the documents are unfinished. 
There is also a problem as to who receives the 
property. The decedents abbreviations of persons and 
property make it unclear as to which individual or property 
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he was discussing. The Estate is not nor should it be 
required to speculate upon the names of the parties in the 
cards, especially since there are different spellings for 
names and uncertainties as to whether they refer to differ-
ent people. 
There is a further public policy reason to deny 
the admission of the documents to probate and that is that 
the Estate should not be awarded such that part of the 
Estate goes by testamentary disposition and the remainder 
goes by another document and/or intestate succession. If 
the Court were to adopt a document as submitted by the 
Petitioner herein, it would require the Estate divide the 
assets and Estate of the decedent pursuant to the three 
3" x 5" cards and speculate as to the intent of the decedent 
as to how he desired to have the remaining assets distributed. 
It would then need to be determined as to whether or not the 
assets would pass by the first Will as first received by the 
Court to be probated (R-19-22), when no act of revocation 
took place as required in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-507, or 
by intestate succession. Further, a Will needs to be 
construed to pass all property which the testator owned at 
his death including property acquired after the execution of 
the Will. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-604 (1953 as amended). 
In this action, the documents are so incomplete 
requiring speculation and conjecture to take place by the 
Personal Representative as to what the testator's intentions 
were, that the document fails to be a holographic will of 
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the decedent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals in reviewing the transcript 
and the evidence presented at trial properly found that the 
Appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof. The 
Appeals Court thus properly reversed the trial court. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
The name of the decedent as contained in the one 
card is placed in the card for identification purposes only. 
The name of the decedent was not placed in the card for 
attestation purposes or to authenticate the three unattached 
cards to be his Last Will and Testament. The decedent had 
the knowledge and the expertise to prepare formal Wills and 
knew the requirements of properly executed Wills. It was 
not the intent of the decedent to have the three cards be 
his holographic will. Additionally, the cards themselves 
are incapable of being probated. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of 
February, 1990. 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Robert E. Erickson 
Attorn 
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RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011 
Attorney for Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
Robert E. Erickson 
311 S. State, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-1300 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) AFFIDAVIT OF SHERYL SWANER 
) 
ROBERT E. ERICKSON, ) District Court No. P83-583 
) Supreme Court No. 870064 
Deceased. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Comes now Sheryl Swaner, who being first duly 
sworn states as follows: 
1. That the Affiant is the daughter of the 
Decedent, Robert E. Erickson. 
2. That at the time that the trial was held in 
this matter, the statement as made by the Affiant at trial 
as set forth on page 28 of the transcript at line 15 should 
state as follows: 
ANSWER NO. 1: His name is not his signature 
writing is kind of different... 
That the Affiant knows of her own knowledge that 
she had stated to the Court that the name as contained in 
the three 3M x 5" cards was not in fact the signature of her 
APPENDIX A 
father, and that it should have been contained at line 15 
page 28 of the transcript of the trial# (R-156 L15) 
FURTHER the Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this /f day of May, 1987. 
si 
Sheryl/Swaner 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
May, 1987, 
day of 
My Commission Expires: 
T-rr-fO 
NcKary Publi^, ^ sTSiQ^a_t M 
Salt-Lake Couhty, Utah 
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fees in connection with the enforcement of 
Stacey's rights under the note Since Sta-
cy's attempt to accelerate the note was 
unsuccessful, Stacey was properly denied 
its attorney fees. 
[6] In regards to Golwix's claim for at-
torney fees, the trial court found that it 
Was "not entitled to an award of fees be-
cause [it] did not prevail on many of [its] 
counterclaims." The letter agreement pro-
vides, however, for the reimbursement of 
Golwix's attorney fees incurred in enforc-
ing any claims for breach of warranty or 
failure of performance. The contractual 
provision is expansively written, encom-
passing a broad range of potential ex-
penses connected with rights arising under 
the contract The mere fact that Golwix 
failed to prevail on some of their counter-
claims does not justify a withholding of 
fees to which they were contractually enti-
tled. "Provisions in written contracts pro-
viding for payment of attorney fees should 
ordinarily be honored by the courts." 
Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah 
1983). Golwix was not only successful in 
its opposition to acceleration of the note, it 
was also successful on some of its counter-
claims. Therefore, even with partial suc-
cess, Golwix was entitled to attorney fees 
for the claims on which it was successful. 
See Trayner, 688 P.2d at 858 (each party 
was entitled to attorney fees where each 
was partially successful). We conclude 
that the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to give effect to the broad contrac-
tual language and partial success of Golwix 
in enforcing its contractual rights. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part The case is 
remanded for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. Costs are awarded 
to Golwix. 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
fc f «Y»UMMISY*TIM> 
KSON v. MISAKA Utah 1085 
3 (Utah App. 1968) 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert 
E. ERICKSON, Deceased, Appellant 
• . 
TaUumi MISAKA, Respondent. 
No. 880139-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 23, 1988. 
A petition for probate of three hand-
written three-inch by five-inch cards as de-
cedent's holographic will was filed. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
John A. Rokich, J., admitted the cards to 
probate, and personal representative ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., 
held that there was no evidence that dece-
dent's name was written in the introducto-
ry clause on one card with the intent that it 
constitute authentication of one or all of 
the cards as a will. 
Final judgment and order vacated. 
1. Wills *=>133 
Decedent's intent is crucial factor in 
determining whether purported holograph-
ic will has been signed within meaning of 
statute pertaining to execution of wills. 
U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503. 
2. Wills *=>130, 131 
Although statutory requirements for 
execution of valid holographic wills are 
minimal, statute is mandatory and not di-
rectory; holographic document is invalid as 
will-despite deceased's clear intent that doc-
ument will be will-unless document com-
plies with governing statute. U.C.A.1953, 
75-2-503. 
3. Wills *»133 
Decedent's handwritten name in body 
of purported holographic will is not, by 
itself, prima facie evidence that document 
contains decedent's signature; handwritten 
name must have been written with intent 
that it operate as authentication of doc-
ument as will in order for it to be signa-
ture. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-12(2Xr), 75-2-503. 
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4. Wills $=>133 
Three handwritten three-inch by five-
inch cards were inadmissible as holograph 
will despite fact that decedent's name was 
written in introductory clause on one card; 
there was no evidence that decedent's 
name was written with intent that it consti-
tute authentication of one or all of cards as 
will. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503. 
5. Wills <3=*133 
It is possible for handwritten name at 
beginning of body of will to be written with 
intent that it be requisite signature, but 
there must be support in evidence for that 
intent. 
Randy S. Ludlow (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
Herschell J. Saperstein, Ken P. Jones 
(argued), Watkiss and Campbell, Salt Lake 
City, for respondent. 
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Robert E. Erickson died in June 1983. 
His formal will, executed June 9, 1955, was 
admitted to probate in July 1983 and the 
designated personal representative appoint-
ed. In October 1985, respondent Tatsumi 
Misaka filed a petition for probate of three 
handwritten 3 ' x 5 ' cards as Erickson's 
holographic will. In this appeal, the per-
sonal representative challenges the trial 
court's admission of the cards to probate. 
Because we conclude there is insufficient 
evidence that Erickson intended his hand-
written name on one of the cards to be his 
signature for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7&-2-503 (1978), we vacate the final or-
der and judgment below. 
[1] The right to dispose of property by 
will is governed and controlled by statute. 
1. The issue presented in this appeal in one of 
first impression in this state. Utah is one of 
sixteen states to adopt all or part of the Uniform 
Probate Code since 1972. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-1-101 to 75-8-101 (1978) (effective July 
1, 1977). The others are: Alaska (1973); Arizo-
na (1974); Colorado (1974); Florida (1975), Ha-
waii (1976); Idaho (1972); Kentucky (1976) 
In re WolcotVs Estate, 54 Utah 165,180 P. 
169 (1919). The introductory Editorial 
Board Comment to Part 5 of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code,1 Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-2-501 through -513 (1978), notes 
that its provisions are intended to validate 
a will whenever possible. This goal is 
achieved, in part, by keeping the formali-
ties for a written and attested will to a 
minimum, see section 75-2-502, and by au-
thorizing holographic wills written and 
signed by the testator: 
A will which does not comply with 
section 75-2-502 [requiring, among other 
things, the signatures of two witnesses] 
is valid as a holographic will, whether or 
not witnessed, if the signature and the 
material provisions are in the handwrit-
ing of the testator 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (1978) (empha-
sis added). As the Editorial Board Com-
ment to section 75-2-502 makes clear, the 
requisite signature need not be at the end 
of a will. If the testator "writes his name 
in the body of the will and intends it to be 
his signature, this would satisfy the stat-
ute." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the dece-
dent's intent is the crucial factor in deter-
mining whether a purported holographic 
will has been signed within the meaning of 
section 75-2-503. See In re Estate ofFeg-
ley, 42 Colo.App. 47, 589 R2d 80, 81 (1978) 
(construing identical statute). 
[2] Although the statutory require-
ments for execution of a valid holographic 
will are minimal, the statute is mandatory 
and not directory. A holographic doc-
ument is invalid as a will—despite the de-
ceased's clear intent that the document be 
a will—unless the document complies with 
the governing statute. In Re WolcotVs 
Estate, 180 P. at 170 (decided under prior 
statute requiring holographic will to be en-
tirely written, dated, and signed by testa-
(only Art. VII, Part 1); Maine (1981); Michigan 
(1979); Minnesota (1975); Montana (1975); Ne-
braska (1977); New Mexico (1976); North Da-
kota (1975); and South Carolina (1987). Due to 
the recency of adoption by only a small minori-
ty of states, there is a dearth of case law con-
struing the provisions of the Uniform Probate 
Code. 
APPENDIX B 
ESTATE OF ERI 
Cite M 766 T2d 1 
tor) See 2 Page on the Law of Wills 
| 20.4 (W. Bowe & D. Parker ed. 1960). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-407 
(1978), proponents of wills in contested 
eases always have the burden of establish-
ing prima facie proof of their due execu-
tion, while contestants bear the burden of 
establishing lack of testamentary intent. 
See In re Estate of Olschansky, 735 P.2d 
927, 929 (1987). 
The proof in support of probate must be 
sufficient to convince the court that the 
paper produced is the lawful will of the 
testator. 
A prima facie case is made when it is 
shown that all the requirements of law 
have been observed in the execution of 
the will, and unless such prima facie case 
is made the court should refuse probate 
even where probate is not contested. G. 
Thompson, The Law of Wills, 3rd Ed., 
§ 199. 
In re Estate of Craddock, 179 Mont. 74, 
586 P.2d 292, 294 (1978) (proponent failed 
to establish prima facie case that purported 
holographic will was written entirely by 
testator, as required by statute). 
Applying these principles to the instant 
case, it was respondent Misaka's burden to 
make a prima facie showing that the pur-
ported holographic will contained the "sig-
nature" required by section 75-2-503. On 
this issue, respondent introduced only the 
three unnumbered and unattached cards, 
which were apparently discovered in a desk 
drawer along with other belongings of de-
cedent They read as follows, with unread-
able portions indicated: 
8/22/73 Last Wni + Test I the F H Store shall go % 
Robert E Enckson do to Dorothy lA to REE 
**reby state that I leave Jr Vi to Sheryl [unreada-
*£<i bequeath to the fol- ble] the other V< is owned 
fewug persons of my faro- by T. Misaka The condo-
fy + others on my demise minium at Park City s to 
I want to leave to my wife go To % REE Jr K to 
Dorothy Enckson the Sheryl + fc T T [Madaka 
2* The findings and conclusions entered by the 
trial court, as well as the appellate briefs of both 
parties, fail to distinguish "intent" for these two 
different purposes. The distinction is pointed 
out in Note, Wills—Validity of Signature for 
Holographic Wills, 28 ArkX.Rev. 521 (1975), dis-
cussing Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Soc'y and 
Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W^d 882 (1974), 
*nd Smith v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 
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home at 1378 Blame Ave or Masaka] My Interest in 
until she remarries, after Nevada Scratch to Go to 
which the home shall be Dorothy in Total 
sold + lh go to her + XU to 
REE Jr + V4 to Sheryl 
Ann Enckson 
My Insurance to cover my 
interest m the Holladay 
store to go to Dorothy in 
Total—$50,000 or more 
other stock interests— 
Some Zions Utah Bank 
[Craft or Croft] to go To 
Sheryl + Bobby Share + 
Share alike 
On the basis of these writings, respon-
dent Misaka is claiming a one-half interest 
in Erickson's Park City condominium. 
Without admission of the index cards to 
probate as a valid holographic will, Misaka 
takes nothing; the distribution of the prop-
erty is controlled by the terms of Erick-
son's formal 1955 will. 
Although the parties and the court below 
seem to have focused on the broader issue 
of whether decedent intended these cards 
to be a will, the relevant inquiry is whether 
the evidence is sufficient to show decedent 
Erickson intended that his handwritten 
name near the top one of the cards be his 
signature.2 Misaka offered no evidence ex-
trinsic to the cards themselves as proof of 
Erickson's intent. The trial court conclud-
ed the three index cards contained the "sig-
nature" required by section 75-2-503 for a 
valid holographic will, without specifying 
the particulars in the three cards relied on 
to implicitly find that Erickson intended his 
handwritten name to be his signature. 
This determination of the decedent's intent, 
based solely on the trial court's examina-
tion of the purported will, is a matter of 
law, see In re Love*s Estate, 75 Utah 342, 
285 P. 299 (1930), which we review on ap-
peal under a correction-of-error standard. 
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist 
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 
1378 (Utah 1987). 
[3] In the definitions provided by the 
legislature to guide construction of Utah 
S.W.2d 741 (1972). In Nelson, as in this case, 
the evidence extrinsic to the purported will itself 
went only to the question of general testamenta-
ry intent, i.e., did the decedent intend the writ-
ing to be a will, not to whether she intended her 
name in the body of the instrument to be her 
signature. Nelson, 257 Ark. at 398. 516 S.VUd 
at 884. 
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statutes, "signature" is defined as includ-
ing "any name, mark, or sign written with 
the intent to authenticate any instrument 
or writing." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 68-3-12(2)(r) (1988). A decedent's hand-
written name in the body of the purported 
holographic will is not, by itself, prima 
facie evidence that the document contains 
the decedent's signature. In the context of 
section 75-2-503, such a handwritten name 
must have been written with the intent that 
it operate as an authentication of the doc-
ument as a will in order for it to be a 
signature. The purpose of our statutory 
scheme is to require a course of conduct 
which assures that a person's will is re-
duced to writing and, when handwritten, 
that the intention to have the writing take 
legal effect be indicated by a signature 
which records that fact. The signature 
requirement shows that the writer finally 
approved the writing and meant for it to be 
operative as a testamentary instrument. 
See Mechern, The Rule in Lemayne v. 
Stanley, 29 Mich.L.Rev. 685, 690-96 (1931). 
[4] Our review of the purported holo-
graphic will in this case leads us to con-
clude that it does not contain the signature 
required by the statute before it can be 
admitted to probate. The three cards in 
evidence are index cards on which only the 
unlined sides have been written. They 
were not attached to each other. There is 
no concluding language on any of the 
cards, and they otherwise give no indica-
tion that they are, taken together, a com-
pleted document. Indeed, the nature of the 
note cards, the use of abbreviations, lack of 
punctuation, and the perfunctory, open-end-
ed wording strongly suggest that the 
cards, as a document, are unfinished or 
constitute a draft. 
Although the handwritten name of the 
decedent appears in the phrase "I Robert 
3. Eg., Smith v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 
S.W.2d 741 (1972) (handwritten name in title 
and exordium clause constitutes signature re-
quired by statute); In re Estate of Glass, 165 
Cal.App.2d 380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958) (handwrit-
ten name in heading of document, This is 
Louis R. Glass"); Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 
(Tex. 1964) (handwritten name in exordium 
clause, 'That I, Roy Wheeler Bell, . . . / ' is signa-
ture required for holographic will). But see In 
re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 P. 404 
E. Erickson do hereby state," the writing 
contains nothing indicating the name was 
intended as the required executing signa-
ture. There is nothing on the face of the 
cards to affirmatively or by necessary im-
plication suggest that decedent wrote his 
name for any other purpose than to iden-
tify himself as the writer. See In re Ber-
nard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 P. 404 
(1925); see generally, Annotation, Place of 
Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.L. 
R.2d 926, 939-44 (1951). In short, there is 
no evidence that decedent's name was writ-
ten in the introductory clause on one card 
with the intent that it constitute authenti-
cation of one or all of the cards as a will. 
Respondent, therefore, failed to make a 
prima facie showing that the purported 
holographic will contained the authenticat-
ing signature required by section 75-2-503. 
[5] It is, of course, possible for a hand-
written name at the beginning of the body 
of a will to be written with the intent that 
it be the requisite signature.3 However, 
there must be support in the evidence for 
that intent. Standing alone, it is equivocal, 
leaving the decedent's final approval and 
authentication of the writing in doubt. 
Without more, it is an inadequate guard 
against writing being deleted, a possibility 
in this case if additional cards were written 
upon by Erickson only to be lost, mis-
placed, or discarded by him or others. 
The final judgment and order of the trial 
court admitting the cards to probate as 
decedent's holographic will is vacated. 
Costs to appellant. 
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
(1925) (no intent that name in exordium be 
signature where document terminated abruptly 
after a specific bequest); Estate of Fegley, 42 
Colo.App. 47, 589 P.2d 80 (1978) (phrase at end 
of instrument "witness my hand ..." followed 
by blank signature space indicates decedent in-
tended to sign later and did not intend hand-
written name in exordium clause to be her 
signature); Davis v. Davis, 86 Okla. 255, 207 P-
1065 (1922) (same phrase and result as Fegley)-
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